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=== Other forms of dualism[[ edit]] ===
Four varieties of dualism. The arrows indicate the direction of the causal interactions. Occasionalism is not shown.
==== Psychophysical parallelism[[ edit]] ====
[[Psychophysical parallelism]], or simply'''parallelism''', is the view that mind and body, while having distinct ontological statuses, do not causally influence one another. Instead, they run along parallel paths (mind events causally interact with mind events and brain events causally interact with brain events) and only seem to influence each other.<sup>[[Philosophy of mind|[43]]]</sup> This view was most prominently defended by [[Gottfried Leibniz]]. Although Leibniz was an ontological monist who believed that only one type of substance, the [[Monad (Greek philosophy)|monad]], exists in the universe, and that everything is reducible to it, he nonetheless maintained that there was an important distinction between "the mental" and "the physical" in terms of causation. He held that God had arranged things in advance so that minds and bodies would be in harmony with each other. This is known as the doctrine of [[pre-established harmony]].<sup>[[Philosophy of mind|[44]]]</sup>
==== Occasionalism[[ edit]] ====
[[Occasionalism]] is the view espoused by [[Nicholas Malebranche]] that asserts that all supposedly causal relations between physical events, or between physical and mental events, are not really causal at all. While body and mind are different substances, causes (whether mental or physical) are related to their effects by an act of God's intervention on each specific occasion.<sup>[[Philosophy of mind|[45]]]</sup>
==== Property dualism[[ edit]] ====
[[Property dualism]] is the view that the world is constituted of just one kind of [[Substance theory|substance]] – the physical kind – and there exist two distinct kinds of properties: [[physical properties]] and [[mental properties]]. In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) inhere in some physical bodies (at least, brains). How mental and physical properties relate causally depends on the variety of property dualism in question, and is not always a clear issue. Sub-varieties of property dualism include:
# [[Strong emergentism]] asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e. in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge in a way not fully accountable for by physical laws. Hence, it is a form of [[emergent materialism]].<sup>[[Philosophy of mind|[8]]]</sup> These emergent properties have an independent ontological status and cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the physical substrate from which they emerge. They are dependent on the physical properties from which they emerge, but opinions vary as to the coherence of [ top–down causation], i.e. the causal effectiveness of such properties. A form of property dualism has been espoused by [[David Chalmers]] and the concept has undergone something of a renaissance in recent years,<sup>[[Philosophy of mind|[46]]]</sup> but was already suggested in the 19th century by [[William James]].
# [[Epiphenomenalism]] is a doctrine first formulated by [[Thomas Henry Huxley]].<sup>[[Philosophy of mind|[47]]]</sup> It consists of the view that mental phenomena are causally ineffectual, where one or more mental states do not have any influence on physical states or mental phenomena are the effects, but not the causes, of physical phenomena. Physical events can cause other physical events and physical events can cause mental events, but mental events cannot cause anything, since they are just causally inert by-products (i.e. epiphenomena) of the physical world.<sup>[[Philosophy of mind|[43]]]</sup> This view has been defended most strongly in recent times by [[Frank Cameron Jackson|Frank Jackson]].<sup>[[Philosophy of mind|[48]]]</sup>
# [[Property dualism|Non-reductive Physicalism]] is the view that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties: mental states (such as qualia) are not reducible to physical states. The ontological stance towards qualia in the case of non-reductive physicalism does not imply that qualia are causally inert; this is what distinguishes it from epiphenomenalism.
# [[Panpsychism]] is the view that all matter has a mental aspect, or, alternatively, all objects have a unified center of experience or point of view. Superficially, it seems to be a form of property dualism, since it regards everything as having both mental and physical properties. However, some panpsychists say mechanical behaviour is derived from primitive mentality of atoms and molecules—as are sophisticated mentality and organic behaviour, the difference being attributed to the presence or absence of [[Complexity|complex]] structure in a compound object. So long as the''reduction'' of non-mental properties to mental ones is in place, panpsychism is not a (strong) form of property dualism; otherwise it is.
[[Dualizm psychofizyczny|'''Dualizm interakcjonistyczny''']]
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